Foreign entry and bank competition are modeled as the interaction between asymmetrically informed principals: the entrant uses collateral as a screening device to contest the incumbent's informational advantage. Both better information ex ante and stronger legal protection ex post are shown to facilitate the entry of low-cost outside competitors into credit markets. The entrant's success in gaining borrowers of higher quality by o¤ering cheaper loans increases with its e¢ ciency (cost) advantage. This paper accounts for evidence suggesting that foreign banks tend to lend more to large …rms thereby neglecting small and medium enterprises. The results also explain why this observed "bias" is stronger in emerging markets.
Introduction
Traditional theories of …nancial intermediation assert that information asymmetries are central to bank lending. Prospective borrowers typically know more about their ability to repay loans than lenders do. Accordingly, banks screen borrowers to select high-quality entrepreneurs and reduce risk of default among low quality ones. A more recent literature on relationship lending takes the view that repeated interactions can reduce such information asymmetries between bank and borrower (see references in Boot, 2004) . According to this view, banks gain "knowledge" about payo¤-relevant borrower attributes during the course of a lending relationship. Consequently, relationships emerge as a prime source of an incumbent bank's comparative advantage over potential outside lenders. This undermines competition in credit markets; the incumbent's superior information about its own clients weakens a competitor's ability to o¤er credit at lower interest rates.
The purpose of this paper is to understand how this problem a¤ects foreign entry and lending behavior in credit markets. 1 Banks are modeled as asymmetrically informed principals: the incumbent has complete information about borrower credit-risk, but the entrant does not. 2 This relies on the notion that much of the information regarding a borrower's unobservable risk can only be obtained in the process of lending (Boot and Thakor 1994, 2000) . This paper studies competition between an entrant bank (uninformed lender) that faces observationally identical borrowers, who can be one of two types (high-risk or low-risk), and an incumbent (informed lender) that can distinguish between these borrower types.
In addition, banks may require the borrower to secure loans with collateral. Interestingly, both theoretical and empirical …ndings have shown that collateral requirements fall over the duration of the bank-borrower relationship (Boot and Thakor, 1994; Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Berger and Udell 1995; Harho¤ and Körting, 1998) . This contrast between secured lending for new borrowers 1 The intention here (and in the title of the paper) is to use the term "foreign" in the broad sense of the word. As Morgan and Strahan (2004, p. 241) observe, "In the United States, banks from other states were long viewed as foreign, and most states strictly forbade entry by banks from other states until the mid-1970s. Even banks from other cities within a state were often blocked from opening branches in other cities in the state. Loosely speaking, the hometown bank was local, and banks from anywhere else were foreign."
2 At the outset, it is important to emphasize that borrower risk here refers to the unobservable component in credit-risk, as opposed to observable risk, that is readily evaluated from company …nancial statements and credit reports. This paper considers de novo foreign entry in terms of outside banks setting up a branch or a subsidiary in a new location. The analysis presented here abstracts from alternative modes of entry like mergers and acquisitions, and from situations that describe the complementarities between informed (bank) capital and uninformed capital (Morgan et al. 2004; Morgan and Strahan, 2005) . and unsecured lending for established ones is suggestive of the information content in collateral requirements (Sharpe, 1990; Boot and Thakor, 1994) . Relevant to the discussion here is the implication that this role of secured credit assumes greater importance for an entrant seeking to create new relationships than for an incumbent lending to its established clients. Accordingly, this paper uses a screening model, based on Besanko and Thakor (1987a, hereafter B-T) , to examine the entrant's use of collateral as a screening device to contest the incumbent's informational advantage.
The results indicate that both ex ante better information and ex post stronger legal protection can facilitate the entry of low-cost outside competitors into credit markets. Market segments characterized by a greater proportion of high-risk borrowers frustrate the entrant's ability to pool borrowers. On the other hand, poor legal protection can prevent the use of collateral as an e¤ective means to successfully sort borrowers. In this model, both pooling and separating equilibria are shown to exist. Importantly, the entrant's success in gaining borrowers of higher quality (lower risk)
by o¤ering cheaper loans increases with its cost advantage. Three major results are summarized here. First, for small cost advantages, the entrant cannot attract both risk types either by pooling or by sorting. Consequently, it succeeds in capturing high-risk borrowers but not the low-risk ones. Second, both the entrant's success in pooling borrowers and its pro…ts from such pooling contracts are increasing in its cost advantage. Therefore, even with a moderate cost advantage, the entrant can successfully pool all borrowers, but only in market segments characterized by a higher fraction of low-risk borrowers. This result of the model helps in understanding the di¤erences in observed lending behavior of entrants and incumbents in di¤erent market segments. It indicates how incumbents are likely to retain clients in riskier segments of the market when faced with more e¢ cient outside competitors that can provide cheaper loans. Third, entry into sectors characterized by stronger information asymmetries requires a su¢ ciently large cost advantage, so that the entrant can successfully sort borrowers. The magnitude of this cost advantage is shown to depend on the legal and institutional features of the host country. As discussed below, this result formalizes a link between …nancial development and the legal and informational environment in which lenders and borrowers operate.
The theoretical results obtained here …nd support in empirical …ndings on entry into credit markets both across states within the US (Jayaratne and Strahan, 1998) and across countries of the world (Claessens et al. 2001; Beck et al. 2004) . The model developed here also o¤ers a new insight for analyzing some of the evidence that has received wide attention in recent empirical studies on (foreign) entry in banking. Claessens et al. (2001) show that the e¤ect of foreign entry is very di¤erent in developed versus developing countries. An important concern in this context is the evidence suggestive of the possibility that foreign (and large national) banks have di¢ culty extending loans to informationally opaque small …rms (Stiglitz, 2000; Berger et al. 2001 Berger et al. , 2005 . This evidence, which appears stronger in emerging markets, has led some policymakers to believe that foreign banks "cream skim" or "cherry pick", leaving the worst risks to the domestic banks. 3 This paper provides an integrated theoretical framework to examine these issues and their implications for policy and institutions (see Section 4 for details).
Theory predicts that collateral can help sort observationally identical borrowers: entrepreneurs with lower risk of default post higher collateral that is unattractive to high-risks (Bester, 1985; Besanko and Thakor, 1987 a,b; Dell'Ariccia and Marquez, 2005) . Clearly, such predictions are based on unobservable risk, and the di¢ culty in estimating such adverse selection models lies in …nding direct measures of unobservable risk characteristics. 4 The representation of banks as asymmetrically informed principals helps in getting around this problem. Here, a borrower's unobservable risk is known only to the incumbent (from previous lending relationships), while a borrower's observable risk is common knowledge. Therefore, by analyzing di¤erences in the equilibrium behavior of asymmetrically informed banks, one can generate testable predictions on collateral use that depend on unobservable risk characteristics.
The work most closely related to this paper is Dell' Ariccia and Marquez (2004, hereafter D-M) , in which an entrant becomes a victim of the "winner's curse" because of the incumbent's informational advantage. The entrant is unable to distinguish between "lemons" rejected by the incumbent and new borrowers shopping around for lower interest rates (Broecker, 1990; Dell'Ariccia et al. 1999 ). An interesting feature of these models is that the incumbent successfully retains all of its creditworthy clients, and therefore, the entrant e¤ectively competes for new borrowers 3 Racocha (2003) observes that, "In the Czech Republic, the privatization of banks had been delayed ... by the experience with foreign banks that were entering the market since 1992 and cherry-picking their clients."
4 On the other hand, testing empirical predictions based on observable risk is relatively simpler. Empirical evidence on pre-loan credit analysis reveals that commercial lenders require the observably risky borrowers to pledge more collateral (Orgler 1970 , Scott and Smith 1986 , Berger and Udell 1990 , 1992 , 1995 , Brick et al., 2005 . This mitigates lenders'problems of moral hazard and strategic default (Boot et al. 1991). only. 5 Yet, at any given time, the number of new entrepreneurs seeking credit may be small when compared to the number of existing …rms in the market. As a result, the entrant's success on entry may depend on its ability to attract clients away from the incumbent. Indeed, as Jayaratne and Strahan (1998, p. 240) note, a "natural process of selection" occurs when "better-managed, lower-cost banks expand at the expense of ine¢ cient ones." Accordingly, this paper aims to study competition over the incumbent's "captive"and creditworthy borrowers and the entrant's ability to attract creditworthy clients away from the incumbent. To this end, I consider a situation where the incumbent's informational advantage extends to all borrowers. Unlike D-M (2004) , banks are armed with the use of collateral requirements in their contracts. The use of collateral is important in this context. First, Morgan and Strahan (2004) observe that foreign banks respond more elastically to collateral shocks than domestic banks. 6 Second, Tornell and Westermann (2004) …nd that collateral is viewed as a signi…cant obstacle to obtaining bank credit in most middle income countries.
Why is removing entry barriers to competition important for credit market e¢ ciency? This paper follows Rajan and Zingales (2003, p.19) in their characterization of "a more e¢ cient …nancial system" as one that "facilitates entry, and thus leads to lower pro…ts for incumbent …rms and …nancial institutions." While there is almost no opposition to the idea that an e¢ cient …nancial system is one that helps new …rms obtain external …nance, theory o¤ers competing hypotheses about whether competition among …nancial institutions (like banks) is bene…cial for economic activity (Gorton and Winton, 2003) . In contrast, a large body of empirical evidence argues that relaxing entry restrictions in banking helps both new and mature …rms obtain external …nance Strahan, 1996, 1998; Black and Strahan, 2002; Cetorelli and Strahan, 2004) . 7 Indeed, any 5 Dell'Arricia and Marquez (2005) study lending booms and …nancial distress in situations where banks use collateral to sort unknown borrowers. Here too, banks are unable to poach pro…tably from the pool of borrowers known to their rivals.
6 Morgan and Strahan (2004) use the value of a country's traded equity as a proxy for the value of potential collateral. Elsewhere, the use of collateral is pervasive in bank lending as reported in empirical studies for US (Berger and Udell, 1990) , UK (Black et al., 1996) and Germany (Harho¤ and Körting, 1998) . The importance of collateral in theoretical studies on bank loans is best understood when one considers the bankruptcy literature; there, bank debt is synonymous with secured debt, as opposed to public debt, that tends to be unsecured (Gertner and Scharfstein, 1991; James, 1996) .
7 Indeed Cetorelli and Strahan (2004, p. 26) assert that recent empirical evidence on this debate is unambiguous, "While theory does not paint a clear picture about how competition in banking ought to a¤ect the …rm-size distribution, the empirical work does. Comparing industry structure across local markets within the U.S., or comparing structure across a large number of countries (both developed and developing), one reaches the same conclusion. ... banks with market power erect an important …nancial barrier to entry to the detriment of the entrepreneurial sector of the economy, perhaps in part to protect the pro…tability of their existing borrowers." theory that seeks to explain the determinants of e¢ cient …nancial systems must account for entry barriers to new …nancial institutions.
A growing literature suggests that a country's institutions a¤ect …nancial development (Beck and Levine, 2005) . Among the most prominent are empirical studies by La Porta et al. (1997 Porta et al. ( , 2000 , which show that better legal protection against expropriation by insiders increases the ef…ciency of …nancial systems (both corporate …nancing and development of …nancial institutions).
For corporate …nancing, their hypothesis follows from theories on corporate governance . In contrast, the precise channel through which a country's legal institutions a¤ect the development of its …nancial institutions (like banks) is less well formalized. 8 Why, for instance, might stronger creditor rights lead to a more e¢ cient banking system? In terms of the characterization of an e¢ cient …nancial system as one that facilitates entry, how might better legal protection assist in the entry of low-cost competitors? This model formalizes a precise channel through which a country's legal environment a¤ects the e¢ ciency of its …nancial markets by facilitating (or discouraging) the entry of low-cost, outside competitors.
Before describing the details of this model, I sketch the intuition. Interestingly, theoretical studies that demonstrate collateral use as a screening device also assume that collateral is costly (Bester, 1985; Besanko and Thakor, 1987a, b; Boot et al., 1991) . Banks incur a dissipative cost in taking possession of and liquidating collateral. Consequently, the lender valuation of collateral is typically lower than that of the borrower (Barro, 1976) . Given that collateral is costly for a bank, better information on borrower credit-risk (gained in the course of a bank-borrower relationship) reduces a bank's incentive to secure loans with collateral. This is consistent with the …ndings that collateral requirements fall over the duration of the bank-borrower relationship. It also implies that in markets with poorer borrower quality overall, collateral assumes greater importance for entrants than for incumbents. Stronger legal protection reduces the deadweight losses of seizing and liquidating collateral and this enables an entrant to bid more aggressively by screening the incumbent's clients. In contrast, weak legal protection discriminates against the uninformed entrant because it reduces the e¢ cacy of collateral use. The model formalizes how variations in law and its enforcement are central to the e¢ ciency and growth of …nancial markets in general (La Porta et al. 1997 , and the banking sector in particular (Levine 1998 (Levine , 1999 .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the basic model. It eliminates a set of dominated strategies for both principals (incumbent and entrant bank). When competing with its rival, a bank will never play from the set of dominated strategies. Section 3 analyzes the equilibria under bank competition. Sections 4 and 5 provide a discussion of the results. All proofs are in the appendix.
The Model
I consider a risk-neutral economy in which each entrepreneur has unconstrained access to collateral. 9 The entrepreneur can borrow $1 from a bank and invest in a project that yields revenue x with probability (1 ) and zero with probability . Following B-T (1987a), a debt contract speci…es a repayment R to the lender if the project is successful, and an amount of collateral C( 0) to be paid to the lender if the project fails; this contract is denoted as (R; C). As in Barro (1976) , I assume a disparity in collateral valuation between borrower and lender by de…ning the lender's valuation of collateral as C, where 0 < 1. The project involves a …xed non-monetary cost U 0 for the entrepreneur (the opportunity cost of her time). Lenders are assumed to have a perfectly elastic supply of funds and I denote the bank's cost of these funds by . The entrepreneur's expected utility is U 0 if she does not borrow, and U (R; C; ) = (1 )(x R) C if she borrows under the contract (R; C). The bank's payo¤ from contract (R; C) is given by (R; C; ) = (1 )R+ C if it lends and 0 otherwise. The surplus generated from a loan contract
Accordingly, when a bank uses a contract with a positive collateral requirement C(> 0), there is a deadweight loss of social surplus in the order of (1 ) C. Banks face a …xed pool of borrowers consisting of two types: fraction of borrowers are high-risk ( = H ) and fraction 1 are low-
(zero-collateral) loan contracts generate positive social surplus.
Using the setup described above, I model competition between an entrant bank (Bank E) and an incumbent that (pre-entry) is a price setting monopolist (Bank I). These banks di¤er on two counts. First, they have di¤erent costs of funds; Bank E's cost of funds is E , while Bank I's cost of funds is I . I assume that these di¤erences in the banks'cost of funds arise because the two banks di¤er in their e¢ ciencies of converting deposits to loans (Freixas and Rochet, 1997, p. 51) . Second, they are asymmetrically informed about borrower types; Bank I can distinguish between a high-risk and a low-risk borrower, while Bank E cannot. 10 
. Also, borrower k's utility from loan (R; C) can be written as
I begin with a discussion of a single bank. A monopolist bank never requires a borrower to secure a loan with collateral. Under both complete and incomplete information, collateral is an ine¢ cient sorting device for a single bank, and is optimally set to zero (B-T, 1987a) . The key to a monopolist bank using collateral to sort borrowers lies in relaxing the assumption that borrowers'reservation utilities are type-independent. Freixas and Rochet (1997) consider a situation of countervailing incentives where borrowers' exogenous reservation utilities are type-dependent-the opportunity 1 0 This stylized assumption follows Bond and Gresik (1997) , and is intended to focus attention on situations where the entrant competes over the incumbent's existing clients.
1 1 Several theoretical models have analyzed competition between symmetrically uninformed principals under perfect competition (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976) , in duopolistic settings Mezzetti 1993, 2000) and in common agency environments (Bernheim and Whinston 1985, 1986) . Although Bond and Gresik (1997) analyze situations of common agency, to the best of my knowledge, theirs is the only other paper to study equilibrium behavior for principals that are asymmetrically informed about agents'preferences. cost of the e¢ cient (low-risk) agent U 0 L is su¢ ciently higher than that of the ine¢ cient (high-risk)
They argue that countervailing incentives, as given by (1), are needed to model an uninformed monopolistic lender that uses collateral as a screening device. This model endogenizes the situation of countervailing incentives by analyzing competition between asymmetrically informed principals.
Theoretically, this helps in modeling the entrant's use of collateral as a screening device to contest the incumbent's information advantage.
Next, I consider contracts under complete information for both the entrant and the incumbent.
Note that collateral is an ine¢ cient sorting device and, under complete information, is optimally set to zero. Therefore, (complete information) contracts with zero collateral requirements are …rst-best because they maximize social surplus. I de…ne R j k to be the …rst-best maximum repayment that Bank j can charge borrower k by providing her reservation utility U 0 , where k = H; L and j = I; E. Analogously, R j k is the …rst-best minimum repayment that bank j can charge under complete information, subject to breaking even on borrower k. These …rst-best repayments are given by
and R
While maximum repayment R j k is the same for either bank (and henceforth, I drop superscript j), the minimum R j k depends on Bank j's cost of funds j , j = I; E. Also, a monopolist bank with complete information would charge R k given by (2), whereas the competitive equilibrium under complete information would have each bank setting repayment at R j k j , given in (3).
Banks as asymmetrically informed principals Turning to the characterization of banks as asymmetrically informed principals, one observes that Bank I's information advantage allows it to charge borrower k any repayment in [R I k ( I ); R k ] and still break even (or better). However, Bank
because it cannot identify borrower types. For example, Bank E's expected pro…ts from its o¤er (R E L ( E ); 0) to low-risks would always be negative because it cannot prevent high-risks from borrowing under this contract. Therefore, o¤ering contract (R E L ( E ); 0) is a dominated strategy for Bank E.
I start by eliminating contracts for each bank that are strictly dominated. In doing so, I describe the sets of contracts that each bank can o¤er in competition. For the incumbent bank, let
denote the set of these contracts (R I k ; C I k ), one for each borrower type, k = H; L. Similarly, the set Z E ( E ) consists of the entrant's o¤ers. This set includes both the set of pooling contracts
(R E P ; C E P ) (subscript P for "pooling"), denoted by Z E P ( E ), and the set of separating contracts
. Finally, I characterize the equilibrium for all possible values of I and E . 12 All proofs are given in Appendix A.
Incumbent Bank
First, since Bank I can identify borrower type, it will optimally set the collateral requirement to zero in all its o¤ers. Second, it is a dominated strategy for Bank I to o¤er a contract with I k < 0. If I k < 0 for some k, then Bank I could pro…tably withdraw this contract and shed the borrowers of type k. Lemma 1 characterizes Bank I's set of o¤ers in Z I k ( I ).
Lemma 1
The incumbent bank o¤ ers borrower k a contract from the set Z I k ( I ) = f(R I k ; 0) :
where R I k ( I ) and R k are the incumbent's …rst-best maximum and …rst-best minimum repayments respectively, k = H; L.
The stylized result of zero collateral requirements in the incumbent's contract is intended to capture a simple feature of credit markets: collateral requirements fall as banks know more about a borrower's credit-risk. To summarize, I can restrict my attention to Bank I's o¤er from the set Z I L ( I ) for low-risk borrowers and the set Z I H ( I ) for high-risk types. From (2) and (3), I get
, and is de…ned by
Entrant Bank Bank E faces borrowers whose participation constraints are determined by the 1 2 An alternative approach could be to compute best response correspondences for each bank. This approach is considerably more complicated and the model becomes less tractable; for example, Bank E's best response to Bank I's o¤er of U utility from contracts o¤ered by Bank I. Therefore, in eliminating dominated strategies for the entrant, I do not use participation constraints explicitly. 13 Note that under competition, highrisk borrowers have the incentive to mimic low-risk ones. 14 A standard result follows: there is no distortion from …rst-best in the uninformed principal's contract for the ine¢ cient agent (high-risk borrower). Bank E never requires high-risks to secure their loans with collateral, i.e., C E H = 0 (Appendix A.2). This holds true for both pooling and separating contracts. 15 Bank E's break-even pooling contract is denoted by (R min P ( E ); 0), where
and
where R E k ( E ) denotes Bank E's …rst-best minimum repayments for borrower k. Bank E's expected pro…ts from (R min P ( E ); 0) are zero; it subsidizes loans to high-risk borrowers with pro…ts from lowrisk ones. The entrant's pooling contracts are summarized in Lemma 2.
Lemma 2
The entrant's o¤ er of a pooling contract is from the set Z E P ( E ) = f R E P ; 0 :
is the minimum the entrant can charge in a pooling contract subject to breaking even.
The next result characterizes Bank E's separating contracts by the following Lemma.
Lemma 3
The entrant's o¤ er of separating contracts
must satisfy:
(c) expected pro…ts from loans to low-risk types are non-negative,
1 3 When we show that the menu of contracts M is strictly dominated by a menu N (i.e., the entrant's pro…ts from N are strictly greater than pro…ts from M ), we also show that menu N yields both borrower types at least as much utility as menu M . In this process of eliminating dominated strategies, it is implicit that if menu M satis…es the relevant participation constraints for both borrower types, so does menu N .
1 4 Under competition, principals o¤er agents more of the surplus so as to prevent competing principals from luring them away. Since the surplus generated from borrower-L is greater than that from borrower-H, high-risks have the incenitve to mimic low-risks to obtain the greater surplus.
. Note that our assertion in footnote 13 holds true.
Result (a) follows from the single-crossing property. 16 Result (b) follows from Bank E's choice
] that satis…es (a) and (b), then Bank E can always pro…tably withdraw the contract for L-types. If L-types now select the remaining contract for H-types, Bank E's expected pro…ts from both types will be positive. This gives (c).
In summary, I will de…ne the set of contracts that Bank E can o¤er by
where Z E P ( ) and Z E S ( ) are given by Lemmas 2 and 3.
Bank competition
The timing of events is as follows. Nature selects borrower types and while Bank I observes this, Bank E does not. Banks move …rst, simultaneously, anticipating agents' subsequent behavior, and optimizing accordingly within the set of contracts. Bank I sets out two contracts, one for each type, from
chooses the contract that maximizes her ex ante expected utility. For example, the low-risk entre-
, borrower L can choose either contract in this menu or Bank I's o¤er of (R I L ; C I L ) to low-risk types. Finally, contracts are executed.
I focus exclusively on pure strategy equilibria. An equilibrium of this game is a menu of contracts such that each bank's choice of menu maximizes its expected pro…ts given the contracts o¤ered by the other bank and the maximizing choices of the borrowers. As is standard in the principal-agent literature, I will assume that if the borrower is indi¤erent between two loan contracts o¤ ered by the same bank, she chooses the one that the bank prefers. Also, if a borrower is indi¤erent between contracts o¤ered by the incumbent and the entrant, in equilibrium she borrows from the bank that makes higher pro…ts from the contract. 17 To derive a complete characterization of equilibria, I hold the entrant's cost of funds constant at E and vary the incumbent's cost of funds I . In what follows, I will describe the equilibria for situations where entrant has the cost advantage, that is, I > E ; …rst, for the entrant's o¤er of a separating contract (Proposition 1) and then for its o¤er of a pooling contract (Proposition 2).
Details of the equilibria for I E , along with all the proofs, are provided in Appendix A. Finally, this section concludes with a summary of the characterization of equilibria (see Table 1 and Figure   2 ).
I begin by describing the solution to a particular case of this problem, namely the situation in which the entrant bank can successfully screen borrowers. As will be described shortly, the entrant bank cannot always successfully screen borrowers; it can only do so when its cost advantage is su¢ ciently large, that is, when I is greater than the screening cuto¤~
. This case is discussed in the next paragraph and the optimal contract for the entrant when I ~ S is derived in Appendix B. The optimal contract derived in Appendix B helps in building the intuition behind the screening cuto¤~ S described in Proposition 1(a).
Bank E can successfully sort all borrowers only if its incentive scheme yields at least as much utility as contracts o¤ered by Bank I. Consequently, Bank E faces borrowers whose reservation utilities are determined by the maximum utility that Bank I can o¤er borrowers, that is, U I k ( I ).
From (4), it follows that
. This inequality holds for all I , given the earlier assumption 
, then the incumbent o¤ ers (R I H ; 0) to high-risks and (R I L ; 0) to low-risks. The 1 8 As mentioned earlier, Freixas and Rochet (1997) require countervailing incentives, the exogenous condition (1), to show an uninformed lender's use of collateral as a screening equilibrium. Note that, here, this condition is derived endogenously.
1 9 Domination by a principal implies that it can attract all agent types away from its rival (Biglaiser and Mezzetti, 1993) .
If I >~ S , the entrant captures all borrowers and its expected pro…ts from all loans are strictly positive. If I =~ S , low-risks borrow from either bank but high-risks borrow only from the entrant.
Expected pro…ts from loans to low-risks are zero but the entrant's pro…ts from loans to high-risks are strictly positive.
The incumbent o¤ ers (R I H ; 0) to high-risks and R I L ; 0 to low-risks where
. High-risks go to the entrant but the incumbent retains the low-risks.
Banks' expected pro…ts from loans disbursed are strictly positive.
The equilibrium in Proposition 1(a) provides a cut-o¤~
such that, when I > S , the entrant can capture all borrowers by o¤ering a separating contract. How does the entrant's cost advantage help in competing with its informed rival? Clearly, a bank with lower cost generates a greater surplus from loans to borrowers than its rival. Thus, it is able to provide a borrower the maximum surplus that its rival can generate (from loans to the same borrower) and still retain a part of the surplus for itself. Providing this surplus is easy when the lender can distinguish borrower type but more di¢ cult when the lender has to sort borrowers. As noted earlier, sorting borrowers with a positive collateral requirement C(> 0) is costly because it implies a deadweight loss of (1 ) C. In Appendix B it is shown that, in a separating equilibrium where the entrant captures the low-risks, it requires the low-risks to secure loans with collateral C E L = I . But, in the event of failure (which occurs with probability L ), the entrant gets only I after liquidation:
an expected loss of (1 ) L I . Since the entrant factors in such ex post deadweight losses in calculating pro…ts ex ante, a simple cost advantage E < I is insu¢ cient to capture low-risks. A greater cost advantage is needed to overcome this informational disadvantage; the condition under which the entrant dominates the incumbent is given by
When the entrant dominates the incumbent by using a separating contract, it gives borrowers two options: the …rst merely matches the incumbent's o¤er to high-risks, but the second o¤ers a cheaper loan rate than the incumbent's o¤er to low-risks. However, among borrowers with indistinguishable risk, the entrant o¤ers the second to only those who pledge collateral. Note that,
since C E L = I , this collateral requirement increases with the entrant's cost advantage (recall that the model assumes that all entrepreneurs have unconstrained access to collateral). In the next section, these results are used to explain why foreign banks tend to lend less to smaller …rms.
The equilibrium described in Proposition 1(b) holds for all values of . Strictly speaking, Proposition 1(b) characterizes a candidate equilibrium; if there is no pooling contract that does better for the entrant, then this candidate will be the equilibrium. Figure 1 illustrates the (candidate) equilibrium in Proposition 1(b) in (R; C) space. Borrowers'payo¤s increase as one moves southwest, while lenders' pro…ts increase going northeast. Indi¤erence curves for borrowers (indicated by U H and U L ) are given by the pairs of thin lines: high-risks have steeper indi¤erence curves than low-risks (single-crossing property). Line 1 (in bold) passing through (R E L ; 0) is the entrant's zero-pro…t line for L-types. Note that it is ‡atter than the indi¤erence curves for L-types. The broken line 2 passing through (R min
] makes zero pro…ts from both H-types and L-types. Clearly, the entrant's o¤ers in Z E ( E ) lie in the shaded region, bounded from below by lines 1 and 2. Bank I o¤ers A 0 to the H-types and C 0 to the L-types. Bank E o¤ers the menu (A 0 ; B 0 ). Here, Bank E's pro…ts from contract B 0 are zero, but Bank I makes positive pro…ts from contract C 0 . On the other hand, Bank I's pro…ts from contract A 0 are zero, but Bank E makes positive pro…ts from the same contract. Accordingly, banks split the market; the high-risks borrow from the entrant and the low-risks borrow from the incumbent. Note that Bank E attracts both borrower types if it
However, it chooses menu (A 0 ; B 0 ) that yields higher pro…ts overall. By holding E constant, the entrant's o¤ers in Z E ( E ) are …xed to the shaded region in Figure 1 . Varying the incumbent's cost of funds I changes minimum repayment R I k ( I ) in (3).
It follows that di¤erent I give rise to di¤erent equilibria in the model. These include equilibria where the entrant pools borrowers as given by the following proposition.
Proposition 2 If 1 and I >~ 2 P ( ) where~
, the entrant pools at (R I L ( I ); 0). The incumbent's best response is to o¤ er (R I H ( I ); 0) to high-risks and (R I L ( I ); 0) to the low-risks. The entrant captures all borrowers and its expected pro…ts overall are non-negative. 1 E ) E , characterizes a feasibility condition for the entrant's pooling contracts; the entrant can successfully pool borrowers only if I >~ 1 P ( ). First, note that for I ~ 1 P ( ), the entrant fails to pool borrowers because the incumbent undercuts the entrant's o¤er to capture low-risk types. Second, this bound is increasing in , indicating that a higher cost advantage is required to pool borrowers in markets characterized by stronger information asymmetries. Finally, for all such pooling contracts, the entrant's pro…ts from loans to low-risks are always greater than that from loans to high-risks.
In fact, if entrant's cost advantage is not too large, it subsidizes losses from high-risks with pro…ts from low-risk borrowers. Consequently, the entrant's choice of a pooling contract is optimal only if the proportion of high-risks in the borrower population is su¢ ciently small ( 1 ).
This gives a second bound,~ and 0 respectively. The sign (x) implies that the bank does not get the borrower. Table 1 summarizes the equilibrium outcomes and shows how the cost advantage of the entrant helps to overcome the information advantage of the incumbent. When the incumbent has both the cost and information advantage, it emerges as a contestable monopolist: it can match any o¤er by the entrant and still make positive pro…ts. Recall that the entrant always o¤ers a zerocollateral contract to high-risks. Therefore, the bank with the lower cost of funds captures high-risk borrowers. Moreover, if neither bank has the cost advantage, both entrant and incumbent can get the high-risks, but in competing with each other, pro…ts from loans to high-risks are run down to zero. To illustrate why the entrant cannot capture low-risks when I = E , recall that it is a dominated strategy for Bank E to o¤er contract (R E L ( E ); 0). When I = E , it follows that R I L =R E L ; and although the incumbent can always o¤er (R I L ( I ); 0) to low-risks, the entrant cannot match this o¤er with contract (R E L ( E ); 0). This characterization of equilibria for I E is given by region I in Figure 2 .
The importance of the (candidate) separating equilibrium can be understood for situations where I <~ S (see Figure 2) . First, consider situations where it is optimal for the entrant to pool borrowers (i.e., 1 ), but o¤ering a pooling contract is infeasible because I ~ 1 P ( ).
Nevertheless, the entrant can capture high-risks in such situations using contracts in Z E S ( E ). 4 Implications of the model I show next that the lessons gleaned from this highly stylized model can be of general interest.
To this end, I discuss some of the important theoretical results (and their associated empirical predictions) in terms of the existing empirical evidence on foreign entry into credit markets.
Domestic welfare
A simple prediction of this model is that the removal of entry barriers lowers the rates at which credit is available to borrowers. Note that even when the incumbent has both cost and information advantage, relaxing entry restrictions means that it can no longer extract the entire surplus generated from loans. The threat of entry forces the incumbent (contestable monopolist) to provide borrowers the surplus that a potential competitor could provide in such situations. Thus, the removal of entry barriers in credit markets signi…cantly raises borrower payo¤s. This initial result agrees with empirical studies like Strahan (1996, 1998 ) that …nd declines in average loan prices of about 40 basis points following branching deregulation in the US.
Interestingly, a rise in pro…ts for the foreign entrant is matched by a corresponding decline in pro…ts for its domestic rival (incumbent). Does foreign entry in banking hurt the domestic economy?
Two key features of the model can help answer this question. First, poaching the incumbent's clients is possible only if the entrant provides them the surplus that the incumbent can generate from loans. From a domestic country perspective, the entry of foreign banks redistributes the surplus from domestic banks to borrowers. Second, the entrant can successfully attract borrowers only when it has the cost advantage. By virtue of its lower cost of funds, the entrant bank generates a greater surplus from a loan contract than the incumbent. These expected e¢ ciency gains can be passed on to the borrowers. For instance, when the entrant o¤ers a pooling contract, high-risks obtain a strictly greater yield than that provided by the domestic bank. To summarize, under no equilibrium are domestic agents (banks and borrowers) worse o¤ in aggregate.
Small business lending, cream skimming and foreign banks Claessens et al. (2001) show that the e¤ect of foreign entry is very di¤erent in developed versus developing countries. First, they …nd that foreign banks have lower pro…ts than domestic banks in developed countries, but the opposite is true in developing countries. Second, their estimation results suggest that an increased presence of foreign banks leads to a lower pro…tability for domestic banks. Not surprisingly, a concern among policymakers and economists, particularly in emerging markets, is that foreign banks "cream skim"or "cherry pick", leaving the worst risks to the domestic banks. A related issue is that foreign banks (and large domestic banks) tend to lend more to large …rms, thereby neglecting small and medium enterprises (SMEs) (Stiglitz, 2000; Berger et al. 2001 Berger et al. , 2005 Clarke et al. 2001) . Evidence in favor of this bias exists for the US (Berger and Udell, 1995; Berger et al. 2005 ) and for developing countries like Argentina (Berger et al. 2001) . Clarke et al. (2001) …nd that foreign bank entry improves …nancing conditions for enterprises of all sizes, although larger …rms bene…t more. However, their study does not distinguish whether foreign banks provide credit to both large …rms and SMEs, or foreign bank competition for large customers leads domestic banks to increase SME credit. 21 The evidence discussed above can be rationalized in terms of the model. Notice that the model characterizes di¤erent equilibria for di¤erent degrees of the entrant's cost (e¢ ciency) advantage. A likely scenario for developed countries is that the foreign entrant's cost advantage is signi…cantly small. The model predicts that for very low degrees of cost advantage, like
an entrant can attract only high-risk borrowers from among the incumbent's clients. Since the incumbent almost always retains borrowers of higher quality, this could explain why foreign banks record lower pro…ts than their domestic counterparts in developed economies.
In contrast, the entrant's cost advantage in developing countries is likely to be higher. Depending on how large this e¢ ciency advantage is, the theory points to two possible scenarios. When this advantage is su¢ ciently large ( I >~ S ), the entrant can use pooling and separating contracts to dominate the incumbent. However, for moderately high cost advantages, like~ S > I >~ 1 P ( ), only a pooling contract allows the entrant to capture all borrowers. In summary, the model predicts that for larger cost advantages, the foreign bank can dominate its domestic counterpart, particularly in sectors where the domestic banks'clients are of superior quality (low-risk). This accounts both for foreign banks recording higher pro…ts than domestic banks in emerging markets and for an increased presence of foreign banks reducing the pro…tability of domestic banks, consistent with the …ndings in Claessens et al. (2001) .
For moderately high cost advantages, the entrant's ability to attract low-risk borrowers depends on the value of . This could explain, for example, the di¤erences in the observed lending behavior of foreign banks in di¤erent market segments. To see this, consider the (domestic) borrower market as composed of di¤erent market segments, each with its own value of . For example, a lower (smaller proportion of high-risks) characterizes a market segment where the average borrower quality is higher. By pooling both risk types, the entrant captures all of the incumbent's clients in these market segments. On the other hand, the entrant (despite its cost advantage) fails to screen borrowers in markets segments characterized by a high (region II in Figure 2 ). In these segments, the entrant can attract only high-risks.
This stylized result has two important implications. First, it helps provide an interpretation of the policymakers'concern about foreign banks "cream-skimming" domestic borrowers. 22 If "creamskimming" is interpreted as dominance over better-quality market segments, then the entrant bank's ability to capture all borrowers in high quality (low ) market segments can be viewed as cream-skimming. On the other hand, if cream skimming is interpeted as the entrant's ability to capture only the low-risk types, then the results show that it is not possible for the entrant to cream-skim domestic borrowers. 23 Second, the result can also explain the precieved lending bias of foreign banks against SMEs. As is well known, small business lending is based on "soft information" and is characterized by a larger proportion of borrowers that are high-risk (in terms of this model, a high ). On the other hand, the large-…rm market segment can be characterized by a larger proportion of borrowers that low risk (i.e., characterized by low ). With a moderately high cost advantage, the entrant captures all borrowers in this market. However, in markets characterized by a high (as is true for SMEs), the incumbent, despite its cost disadvantage, retains the low-risk types.
Whereas the entrant gains all borrowers in the large-…rm market segment, it succeeds in attracting only a fraction of the borrower population in the small-…rm segment, accounting for the observed bias in lending.
Legal protection
In markets with a larger fraction of high-risk borrowers (higher ), a low cost entrant can successfully sort borrowers only if its cost advantage is su¢ ciently large (region III in Figure 2 ). Securing loans with collateral entails a deadweight loss of (1 ) L I . This loss is high in environments where is low; that is, when dissipative costs of seizing and liquidating collateral are high. 24 The parameter is the fraction of the pledged collateral that the lender can recover in the event of a default on the loan. Stated di¤erently, can be viewed as a proxy for legal e¢ ciency, with higher s corresponding to better legal enforcement. 25 Either way, stronger creditor protection and/or 2 3 Admittedly, I have assumed that the entrant has the informational disadvantage. However, note that the principal-agent literature discusses cream-skimming by an uninformed principal (entrant) as an equilibrium where the ine¢ cient agent (high-risk borrower) can be priced out of the market (Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005, p. 604) . This involves the entrant o¤ering a shutdown contract that is accepted only by the e¢ cient agent (low-risk borrower), but rejected by his ine¢ cient counterpart (La¤ont and Martimort, 2002, p. 38) . However, this model shows that under competitive pressures from the incumbent, the entrant cannot o¤er a shutdown contract in equilibrium. Moreover, in a separating equilibrium where the entrant dominates, the entrant's ex ante expected pro…ts from high-risk borrowers are always greater than that from low-risk borrowers. Thus, the entrant would not choose to cream-skim low-risk borrowers.
2 4 This could range from direct costs, like legal fees and accounting services, to indirect costs like time and e¤ort in acquiring and selling the secured asset. Also, deadweight losses may arise from information and holdout problems that characterize …nancial distress (Gertner and Scharfstein, 1991; James, 1996) .
2 5 A caveat in this interpretation is that some of the debate on the distribution of rights between creditor and debtor is misguided. Stiglitz (2001, p. 4) observes "what is critical is the clarity of those rights; presumably, the terms of the contract can be adjusted to re ‡ect those rights....Di¤erent bankruptcy rules do impose di¤erent information burdens better law enforcement reduces the losses from default and thus encourages entrants to bid more aggressively for borrowers. This leads to a testable prediction of the model:
Prediction : Ceteris paribus, countries with bankruptcy codes that reduce the cost of liquidating collateral should witness greater foreign bank lending.
The entrant's success in gaining borrowers of higher quality by o¤ering cheaper loans is su¢ -ciently enhanced by increasing the e¢ ciency of collateral use. In a recent study on how legal changes a¤ect lending behavior, Haselmann et al. (2005) …nd that lending volume increases subsequent to legal changes facilitating the use of collateral, and that foreign green…eld banks extend their lending volume substantially more than domestic banks. Markets where creditor rights provide stronger protection to lenders will witness lower deadweight losses both in the repossession and in the liquidation of collateral; this, in turn, will promote entry of low-cost competitors. The argument above summarizes how an e¢ cient legal framework helps in building an e¢ cient …nancial market by promoting entry of low-cost competitors. It provides a theoretical underpinning for empirical …ndings on the legal determinants of the development of …nancial intermediaries like banks (Levine 1998 (Levine , 1999 .
It is worthwhile to recall that stronger legal protection (higher , and consequently, a lower S ) makes it easier for entrants to sort borrowers. Conversely, poor legal practices that increase deadweight losses (a higher~ S ) can exacerbate the di¢ culties that foreign entrants face in lending to informationally opaque small …rms. This result in the model explains why the foriegn banks'
bias against SMEs appears stronger in emerging markets, where deadweight losses, both in the repossession and in the liquidation of collateral, can be quite large. As stated above, this has important policy implications for host countries: better creditor protection can facilitate foreign bank lending to small businesses.
Borrowers with collateral constraints
The previous result begs the following question: does the entrant's large …rm bias disappear if it can successfully screen high-risk borrowers? This model can be extended to show that the uninformed lender's bias towards larger …rms can persist even if lending towards SMEs as a whole increase.
and imply di¤erent allocations of risk bearing, and some of these arrangements may actually be ine¢ cient."
Here, the separating equilibria in this framework identify a di¤erent mechanism at work. The earlier assumption that borrowers have unconstrained access to collateral is relaxed. In particular, it is assumed that there exists a distribution of borrowers (…rms) who di¤er in their ability to post collateral. More speci…cally, I now assume that within a group of borrowers with indistinguishable risk, larger …rms can readily post more collateral (per dollar of borrowings) whereas smaller …rms can only pledge a lower C. This new assumption alters little in terms of equilibrium behavior of banks. In particular, one can focus attention on the equilibrium described in Proposition 1(a).
Note that, if the entrant reduces the collateral requirement for low-risks, incentive compatibility requires that it reduce loan rates for the high-risks as well. Also, it can be shown that the entrant's pro…ts from the high-risks ( E H ) are greater than that from low-risks ( E L ) (See Appendix B):
Given that the pro…ts from high-risks are strictly greater than that from low-risks, the entrant will not alter its collateral requirement for low-risks as long as the proportion of high-risks in the population is large ( >^ ). Simply put, the entrant o¤ers the following two options: (i) loans at a rate similar to the domestic bank's o¤er to high-risks and (ii) loans at a rate cheaper than the domestic bank's o¤er to low-risks, but only to those who pledge collateral C E L = I . In terms of the model, this implies that among borrowers with indistinguishable risk, the cheaper loan is available only to those willing to pledge collateral. This result gives another prediction of this model:
Prediction : Conditional on observable risk, entrants to a credit market provide cheaper loans only to those borrowers who are willing to pledge (more) collateral.
From a borrower's perspective, it appears that o¤ers by the entrant are biased towards larger …rms that can readily post collateral. Low-risk borrowers that cannot post this collateral will go to the (informed) local bank. This result accounts for the perceived bias in the entrant's separating contracts: larger …rms that can post collateral go to the entrant, while the incumbent attracts only low-risk borrowers that are constrained in their ability to post collateral.
An important consideration here is that small …rms tend to be observationally riskier than large …rms. However, within the same categories of observable risk, it is likely that larger …rms can readily ful…l the collateral requirement that smaller …rms cannot. There is some evidence in support of this phenomenon: Haynes et al. (2001) show that the smallest among small business borrowers in the US have less access to credit from large banks than other small business borrowers.
Again, one can explain why this problem turns out to be greater in emerging markets. First, note that the information problems are likely to be more acute (greater ) in developing countries.
Second, the entrant's cost advantage is also likely to be greater (higher I ). In terms of the model, a greater cost advantage implies a higher collateral requirement (C E L = I ). Finally, the collateralizable wealth of borrowers tends to be lower in developing countries. These three factors can combine to make this bias against SMEs seem more acute in developing countries.
Conclusion
This paper makes several contributions to the literature. To the best of my knowledge, it is the …rst paper that analyzes bank competition as competition between asymmetrically informed principals where contract menus (loan rates and collateral) are the strategic variables of competition. This theoretical approach has some important advantages.
First, it helps tie the early literature on information theories of credit to more recent studies in law and …nance under a single framework. In a recent paper, Djankov et al. (2004) classify the literature on private credit into two broad, but interlinked categories: information theories of credit and theories that stress the importance of creditors' rights. This paper demonstrates how these two categories are interlinked; it supports their assertions that better legal environment can help overcome the stronger informational disadvantages that potential entrants encounter in credit markets. Conversely, limited property rights and poorly functioning legal systems can combine to reduce the use of collateralizable assets, thereby diminishing potential entrants'ability to sort borrowers. This conclusion from the model provides a theoretical underpinning for recent empirical studies on the importance of legal environments in explaining the variation in the size of private credit markets.
Second, as shown in the previous section, the results in this paper …nd support in empirical work related to foreign entry in banking. Furthermore, the model makes two testable predictions. First, ceteris paribus, countries with bankruptcy codes that reduce the cost for seizing and liquidating collateral should witness greater foreign bank lending, particularly to SMEs. Second, the model predicts that in lending to observably riskier borrowers (like small …rms) entrants to a credit market are likely to provide cheaper loans only to borrowers pledging more collateral. As mentioned earlier, these predictions on collateral use depend on borrowers'unobservable risk characteristics as opposed to previous studies that discuss observable risk.
Third, the model allows us to explore the impact of entry and bank competition on …rms'access to credit. In particular, this model can explain the perceived bias that foreign (and large domestic)
banks lend more to large …rms thereby neglecting small enterprises. At the same time, it also explains why better informed domestic and local banks continue to …nd a market among such small …rms. Lastly, it shows why this bias can be stronger in developing countries.
A …nal observation is that cream skimming by foreign banks can be rationalized if one de…nes cream-skimming as capturing market segments of higher (average) quality. However, creamskimming interpreted as the poaching of only high-quality borrowers in a given market segment is not an equilibrium in this framework. On the contrary, this paper suggests that entrants with a cost advantage have to engage in costly screening only for the better …rms, not the high-risk ones. H ); (R E L ; C E L )] will (a) satisfy the participation and incentive compatibility constraints for all borrowers and (b) result in higher pro…ts for the entrant (see Extended Appendix for details). Hence the entrant's o¤er sets collateral requirement of the high-risk borrower to zero; this is true for both pooling and separating contracts (see footnote 14). Hence pooling contracts are of the form (R E P ; 0) where 
show that in any equilibrium where the entrant dominates the incumbent, it must be true that
leads to unambiguously higher pro…ts while ensuring that low-risks accept the new contract. Therefore, the
RHS is positive for > 1 . Intuitively, the entrant charges a higher R E H when the proportion of highrisks in the population is high and (a) follows. Solving the last two equations, one gets R E L = C E L = I and the entrant's pro…ts are strictly positive when [1 (1 ) L ] I > E and this gives us the cut-o¤
. If I =~ S , it follows that E L (R E L ; C E L ) = 0. With Bank I o¤ering (R I L ; 0), both banks run down pro…ts to zero pro…ts and the low-risk borrower borrows from either bank.
(b) Finally, when I <~ S it follows that E L (R E L ; C E L ) < 0. In this situation, the entrant is forced to revise its o¤er to [(R I H ; 0);
, Bank I revises its o¤er with R I L ; 0 to the low-risk borrower such that U L R I L ; 0 = U L (R E L ;C E L ) < U L (R I L ; 0). It follows that R I L >R I L , and Bank I now makes positive pro…ts from the low-risk borrower. Also, the entrant's o¤er to the high-risk borrower is (R I H ; 0) where R I H >R E H and the entrant makes positive pro…ts of the high-risk borrower. Thus, in this equilibrium, the high-risk borrower borrows from Bank E while her low-risk counterpart borrows from Bank I (see Figure 1 ).
(A.5) Proof of Proposition 2
First, for a pooling contract R E P ; 0 to hold, the entrant has to ensure that it can capture the low-risk borrowers. Therefore, it must be true that R I L > R min P , that is ) E , the entrant covers expected losses from high-risks with pro…ts from low-risks. Comparing the entrant's pro…ts from pooling and separating contracts, one can show that the entrant chooses the pooling contract only when 1 (see (B.8) in Appendix B). Note that, for I ~ S , the entrant gets the high-risk borrower only. Here comparing pro…ts, gives us the second cuto¤ 2 6 For all such contract o¤ers, increasing entrant's pro…ts from high-risks (by raising R E H ) implies lowering pro…ts from low-risks (lowering R E L and raising C E L ). Thus the entrant's choice of optimal contract depends on .
, such that if I >~ 
. Note that if I < E , the incumbent captures all borrowers but if I = E , Borrower-H borrows from either bank but Borrower-L borrows from the incumbent only (see Extended Appendix for details).
Appendix B: Entrant' s optimization problem for
Bank E's problem can be viewed as a principal facing agents under incomplete information where the agents' outside opportunities are determined by the max. utilities that Bank I can provide. Borrower goes to Bank E only if it o¤ers an incentive scheme yielding at least, maximum utility, U I k , i.e., reservation utility in borrower's IR constraint is now U I k .
Max
[(1
The following results hold in equilibrium (i) the H-types are not required to put down any collateral, C E H = 0; Given Bank E o¤ers the pooling contract (R I L ; 0) its pro…ts from low and high-risks are given by Note that, when Bank E o¤ers a separating contract, its pro…ts from loans to the high-risk borrower are higher than pro…ts from loans to low-risk borrowers. The converse is true for a pooling contract.
